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ASSESSING FACTORS AFFECTING
 THE REPAYMENT RATE OF
MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS
A Case Study of Village Credit Institutions
of Gianyar, Bali
Lincolin Arsyad
This paper attempts to assess the influence of several factors on
the repayment rate of the Village Credit Institutions (Lembaga
Perkreditan Desa or simply LPDs) in Gianyar district in Bali. Using
a quantitative approach (logistic model) the findings of this study
indicate that the Balinese social custom, including social values,
norms, and sanctions (informal institutions) have an influence on
sustaining the high repayment rate of the LPDs. This finding con-
forms to the some previous studies using institutional approach that
reveal the high repayment rate of the LPDs in Gianyar district is
influenced by their institutional arrangement that based on custom
regulation which includes social norms, sanctions, and involvement
of custom village leader in screening process and contractual en-
forcement of loan (informal institutions), by regulations set up by the
Central Bank (formal institutions), and by the mechanism of collect-
ing loan repayments applied by the LPDs management.
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Introduction
The term microfinance refers to
the provision of financial services (gen-
erally savings and credit) to low-in-
come clients (ADB 2000; Ledgerwood
1999; Robinson 2001). The clients are
often identified as traders, street ven-
dors, small farmers, service providers
(hairdressers, rickshaw drivers), and
artisans and small producers, such as
blacksmiths and seamstresses. In prac-
tice, however, in addition to financial
intermediation, some microfinance
institutions provide social intermedia-
tion services such as group formation,
development of self-confidence, and
training in financial literacy and man-
agement capabilities among members
of a group intended to benefit low-
income women and men (Bennett 1998;
Ledgerwood 1999). Part of the rea-
sons is because low-income people
face strong barriers (such as illiteracy,
gender discrimination, and remote-
ness) in trying to gain access to ordi-
nary financial service institutions
(Ledgerwood 1999: 63). This means
that the skills and confidence of low-
income people have to be developed in
addition to credit provision. There-
fore, the microfinance approach is not
a minimalist approach offering only
financial intermediation but an inte-
grated approach offering both finan-
cial intermediation and other services
mentioned above (Ledgerwood 1999:
65). It can also then be expected to
reduce poverty and to develop and
strengthen the institutional capacity of
local financial systems through find-
ing ways to cost-effectively lend money
to poor households (Ledgerwood 1999;
Morduch 1999; Morduch 2000; Otero
1999; Snow 1999).
Microfinance institutions are gen-
erally characterized by a collage of
dynamic, innovative, and flexible ar-
rangements tailored to the local eco-
nomic and social environment (Adams
and Fitchett 1992: 3). They argue that
these arrangements are resilient and
that many of them have grown over a
long period. This flexibility is accorded
by the limited regulation, along with
small size, with most microfinance
institutions operating in a circum-
scribed area, or in a specific niche of
the market where personal knowledge
of borrowers is possible (Ghate 1988).
The type of transaction is small and
short-term, which is based on personal
relationships or the institution’s inti-
mate knowledge of its clientele (Wai
1992), and which usually occur close
to where clients live, shop, or work. To
facilitate the clients’ entry, microfi-
nance institutions also apply a simple
application procedures, and loans are
disbursed quickly (ADB 2000). The
interest rates charged by microfinance
institutions are market-oriented and
intended to cover both their opera-
tional and financial costs, based on the
assumption that the poor are willing to
pay for access and convenience. To
sum up, Wai argues that these arrange-
ments are flexible, adapt to economic
change, innovative, involve low trans-
action costs for both lender and bor-
rower, and result in high loan recovery
rates (Wai 1992: 340).
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As a lending institution, micro-
finance is a risky business because
repayment of loans can seldom be fully
guaranteed. The failure of a large num-
ber of microfinance institutions in
many developing countries was due,
among other things, to their inability
to ensure good repayment rates among
their borrowers (Adams 1984;
Woolcock 1999; Yaron 1994). Ac-
cording to some authors (Christen
1998; Sharma and Zeller 1997;
Woolcock 1999; Yaron 1994; Zeller
1998), the repayment rate is the most
important performance indicators of
microfinance institution. Woolcock
(1999), for instance, points out that the
most common measure of a micro-
finance program’s performance is its
loan repayment rate, since this has a
large bearing on whether a program is
likely to be financially sustainable.
Yaron (1994) also emphasizes that a
high profit earned by micro-finance
institutions cannot be used as the only
indicator of self-sustainability of the
institutions, since a high profit could
be attained only in the short period.
Attaining a high rate of loan collection
(repayment rate) is a necessary condi-
tion for a micro-finance institution to
become self-sustainable in the long
run. Loan losses often have been the
largest cost borne by the institutions
and the principal cause of insolvency
and illiquidity. The importance of the
portfolio quality indicator including
the repayment rate is also reflected in
the health criteria of banking institu-
tion in Indonesia set up by the Central
Bank –the so-called CAMEL criteria –
that gives a high weight of thirty per-
cent for this indicator (Bank Indonesia
1997).
This paper attempts to assess the
influence of several factors on the re-
payment rate of the Village Credit
Institutions [Lembaga Perkreditan
Desa (LPD)] in Gianyar district in
Bali. The rationale in selecting LPDs
in Gianyar as the case of this study is
an explorative reason. An exploratory
case1 may be selected for the examina-
tion of a subject area on which there is
little prior theory or evidence avail-
able (Scapens 1990: 272-273). Based
on this perspective, the LPD case is an
exploratory one since even though the
LPD is considered to be a fully sustain-
able microfinance institution in Indo-
nesia by some scholars (Chaves and
Gonzales-Vega 1996; Christen et al.
1995), the LPD represents a micro-
finance institution little understood
from the point of view of its sociocul-
tural context, its management, and
other factors influencing its perfor-
mance.
The paper is structured as fol-
lows. Section 2 briefly discusses the
development of the LPDs in Gianyar
district in Bali and followed by a short
description of their sociocultural envi-
ronment. Section 4 presents the meth-
odology and the results of analysis.
Conclusions are presented in the last
section.
1 Yin uses the terms ‘representative’ or ‘typical’ case (see Yin 2003: 42)
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The Development of LPD of
Gianyar
The LPDs are community-based
financial institutions (microfinance
institutions) that are owned, managed
and used by the members of the cus-
tom village (desa adat) in Bali (Gov-
ernment of Bali 1988). The first LPD
was established in 1984 and many
more followed in the following years.
The objectives of establishing an LPD
in each custom village are to support
rural economic development through
enhancing savings behavior of rural
people and providing credit for small-
scale enterprise, to eliminate exploit-
ative forms of credit relations, to cre-
ate an equal opportunity for business
activities at the village level, and to
increase the degree of monetization in
rural areas (Government of Bali 2002).
These objectives reflect the develop-
ment mission of the LPDs to provide
financial service for rural people in
Bali.
In Gianyar district of Bali, the
first Village Credit Institution (LPD)
established was LPD Manukaya, as
one of LPD pilot projects, located in
Table 1. General indicators of Village Credit Institutions (LPDs) within Gianyar
District of Bali Province, 1999-2001
General Indicators 1999 2001
Information on the Village Credit Institutions (LPD):
 Number of LPDs 142 174
 Number of staff 723 873
 Total assets (billion Rp) 58 125
 Total equity (billion Rp) 10.9 25.4
 Total profit (billion Rp) 4.4 10.2
Lending and savings activities:
 Volume of loans outstanding (billion Rp) 36 89
 Number of borrowers 36,454 49,593
 Average loans size per borrower (000 Rp) 954 1,603
 Volume of time deposits (billion Rp) 23 47
 Number of time deposits account (depositors) 6,820 7,948
 Average deposit per depositor (million Rp) 3.5 5.7
 Volume of savings (billion Rp) 22.5 50
 Number of savings account (savers) 81,178 114,994
 Average savings per saver (000 Rp) 243 415
 Bank deposits in Bank BPD Bali (billion Rp) 20 29
Financial intermediation indicators:
 Deposits to loan ratio (DLR) in % 111 106
 Savers and depositors to borrowers ratio (%) 241 248
Source: PLPDK, Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province 1999 and 2001
(computed by the author).

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the custom village of Manukaya in
1984. Subsequently, the growth of LPD
in Gianyar district has been very fast.
On the one hand, the rapid rise of LPDs
is due the increasing demand of Ba-
linese for rural financial institutions
since the institutions have been able to
meet their needs for an easy access for
credit (Arsyad 2005b; Arsyad 2005).
On the other hand, the provincial gov-
ernment of Bali and Bank BPD Bali
actively support the establishment of
new LPDs by funds provision as an
initial capital and supervision for the
establishment of the LPDs. The pro-
vincial government of Bali plans to set
up one LPD in each of the 1,600 cus-
tom villages.
As seen in Table 1, at the end of
2001, it was recorded that 174 LPDs
have been established in Gianyar dis-
trict, and they were spread over all of
the seven subdistricts. These LPDs
together employ 873 employees di-
rectly. In terms of asset development,
the LPDs of Gianyar have also experi-
enced a remarkable growth. Table 1
also shows that in only two years be-
tween 1999 and 2001, total assets in-
creased almost 2.5 times from Rp58
billion to Rp125 billion. This growth
was mainly caused by the growth of
loans outstanding that more than
doubled from Rp36 billion in 1999 to
Rp89 billion in 2001. In addition, es-
tablishment of new LPDs also has in-
creased the total assets.
Meanwhile, its equity also more
than doubled from Rp10.9 billion in
1999 to Rp25.4 billion in 2001. Equity
here refers to value to invested capital
(initial investment) plus retained earn-
ings. The increasing equity resulted
from the increase of retained earnings
(total profit). As shown in Table 1,
total profit of the LPDs has increased
from Rp4.4 billion in 1999 to Rp10.2
billion in 2001. In addition to the profit,
the initial investment for new estab-
lishments of the LPDs also has raised
the total equity.
The main activity of the LPDs is
lending-savings activity for mainly
small-scale entrepreneurs, small trad-
ers, and farmers. The volume of loans
outstanding also rapidly increases from
year to year. The data in Table 1 shows
that in 1999 the volume of loans out-
standing was Rp36 billion and in 2001
this amount increased to Rp89 billion.
Moreover, other than the volume of
loans outstanding, the number of bor-
rowers also increased from 36,454
borrowers to 49,593 borrowers in the
same period.
The development indicators of
LPDs from deposits side are savings
and time deposits. Both savings and
time deposits are very high, not only in
terms of the value of funds generated,
but also in terms of the number of
savers and depositors. Table 1 shows
that the total amount of funds gener-
ated from the clients through savings
and time deposits exceeded the total
amount of loans outstanding in 1999
and 2001. In 1999 the generated funds
from the clients were Rp45.5 billion
while the total of loans outstanding
were Rp36 billion. In 2001 these
amount increase to Rp97 billion and
Rp89 billion respectively. Table 1 also
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shows that the number of savers and
depositors also exceeded the number
of borrowers in 1999 and 2001. In
2001, the number of borrowers of
49,593 was much lower than the num-
ber of savers and depositors accounts
of 122,942. These high growth of num-
ber of borrowers, outstanding loans,
savings and deposits is the evidence of
strong client demand.
The figures above will in turn
affect the deposits to loans ratio (DLR)
and savers (and depositors) to borrow-
ers ratio. Table 1 shows that these two
ratios were higher than 100 percent
and the most remarkable thing is that
the savers and depositors to borrowers
ratio exceeded 200 percent in 1999
and 2001. This phenomenon implies
that the LPDs in Gianyar have suc-
ceeded in achieving their role as finan-
cial intermediaries and to enhance their
outreach, which is a proxy of its posi-
tive impact on rural economic devel-
opment. There are five main reasons
that could explain this phenomenon
(Arsyad 2005b; Arsyad 2005). Firstly,
the high savers and depositors to bor-
rowers ratio might be caused by social
and cultural ties (social cohesion) be-
tween the people in a custom village
and its LPDs. Secondly, the people
have an easy access to reaching the
LPD since the LPD is located in a
custom village. Therefore, transporta-
tion cost is very low or even zero. This
could also be an attractive factor for
the clients to save their money in LPDs.
Thirdly, the LPDs also apply a simple
and easy procedure –both in lending
and saving services– and use mobile
banking techniques to reach their cli-
ents. Fourthly, the competition among
financial institutions is not tight in the
village level. Lastly, the growth of
those figures might also be affected by
the stable and growing economy of
Gianyar district. Presently, Gianyar
district with a population of 395,000 is
one of the growth engines of Bali’s
provincial economy. According to Sta-
tistics of Bali Province 2001, with
Gross Regional Domestic Product
(GRDP) of Rp 2,307 billion, Gianyar
was the fourth biggest contributor
(12.16%) to Bali province after Badung
district (20.86%), city of Denpasar
(19.19%), and Buleleng district
(12.19%). Based on GRDP per capita,
Gianyar was ranked third after Badung
district and city of Denpasar in the
same period. During Indonesian eco-
nomic crisis from 1997 until 1999, the
Gianyar economy still experienced a
positive economic growth. Gianyar
economic growth rates were 6 and 4.5
percent annually in 1997 and 2001,
respectively. Its economic growth rate
in 2001 was higher than Bali and na-
tional average growth rate of 3.4 and
3.3 percent per annum, respectively.
According some studies (Chaves and
Gonzales-Vega 1996: Franks 2000;
Robinson 2001), it is argued that
microfinance institutions can evolve
sustainably in a stable and growing
economy.
From another perspective, the
rapid growth in the number of borrow-
ers, savers, depositors, loan outstand-
ing, savings and deposits –as has been
noted earlier– is evidence of strong
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clients demand in Gianyar district.
According to some interviewees2 and
Oka (1999), the rapid growth is an
indication that the LPDs have –as fi-
nancial institutions– suited to the needs
of rural people and succeeded to de-
velop a trust of them.
On the contrary, the high savings
and deposits growth rates could be a
burden for the LPDs to pay the interest
cost. To avoid this problem the LPDs
deposit some of their unloanable funds
(excess liquidity) –at market interest
rate– in Bank BPD Bali in accordance
to the Bali Provincial Regulation No.8/
2002, Article 7 (Government of Bali
2002). Table 1 shows that the LPDs’
deposit in Bank BPD Bali was quite
high. It was Rp20 billion in 1999, or
about a half of savings plus time de-
posits, and Rp29 billion in 2001, or
about one-third of savings plus time
deposit. Besides its operational income,
this large number of the LPD deposits
in Bank BPD Bali has also contributed
the total income of the LPDs and, in
turn, increased its total profit from
Rp4.4 billion to Rp10.2 billion in 1999
and 2001 respectively, as shown in
Table 1. On the other hand, this large
number of the LPDs deposit to Bank
BPD Bali also indicates that the ab-
sorption capacity of rural people for
credit is still limited. This condition,
however, is mainly caused by the small
and limited operational area of each
LPD which is restricted to only one
custom village according to the regu-
lation mentioned above (Government
of Bali).
Sociocultural Environment of
the LPDs
Socio-cultural characteristics of
an environment are also one of the
important factors in the success of
microfinance institutions (Chaves and
Gonzales-Vega 1996; Franks 2000;
Robinson 2001; Snow 1999). This sec-
tion discusses the socio-cultural char-
acteristics of the Balinese focusing on
the custom village (desa adat) and
banjar (hamlet) as corporate groups
(social system) since it will be very
useful in assessing the factors affect-
ing the repayment rate of the LPDs. As
widely known and argued, some of
these sociocultural factors have played
a major role in the success of govern-
ment programs such as family plan-
ning, small-scale industry training, and
loan programs in Bali (Jayasuriya and
Nehen 1989: 13; Warren 1991: 233).
In Bali, besides the administra-
tive village (desa dinas), which is an
element of government administration,
Balinese also recognize the existence
of custom villages. The administrative
village or perbekelan was first intro-
duced by the Dutch in the early part of
the twentieth century as the basic unit
of colonial government (Warren 1993:
22). The existence of administrative
village in Bali and all over Indonesia
2 The list of interviewees is presented in Appendix 1
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was reinforced by the Government of
Republic of Indonesia through the Vil-
lage Government Law No. 5/1979. This
Law sets out to create a uniform local
administrative structure across Indo-
nesia, with the stated objective of in-
creasing the effectiveness of village
administration and public participa-
tion in development policy (Warren
1991: 238). However, custom villages
in Bali continued to exist as customary
institutions and to function alongside
their newly created administrative
counterparts.
The custom village is an associa-
tion of people rather than a geographic
or administrative unit. Warren (1993:
20) describes the custom village as “a
corporate community sharing collec-
tive descent from the original village
founders, who are worshipped as dei-
fied ancestors in the classic three vil-
lage temples the so called Kahyangan
Tiga (The Three Holy Temples).” Each
of the three temples has a special func-
tion and location in the village (Geertz
and Geertz 1975; Hobart et al. 1996).3
There are two fundamentals dif-
ferences between custom village (desa
adat) and administrative village. The
desa dinas boundaries are determined
along administrative lines and seldom
coincide with those of the custom vil-
lage. The custom village leader, the
so-called Bandesa Adat, is elected and
custom matters are decided by the com-
munity (banjar) members in a demo-
cratic way in the custom village meet-
ing (paruman desa). In contrast, dinas
(administrative) leaders, the so-called
Perbekel or Kepala Desa, are appointed
by, and responsible to, higher govern-
ment levels such as subdistrict and
district government level. According
to Nordholt (1991), in the Soeharto
era, villages maintained the right to
choose their Perbekel or Kepala Desa
in Bali, but in practice there were sev-
eral restrictions. Candidates were
screened and sometimes there was pres-
sure from above to eliminate candi-
dates considered to be too independent
or anti Golkar (state party) (Nordholt
1991).
The status of the custom village as
a societal unit based on customary law
was reinforced by the Bali Provincial
Regulation of 1986 on the Status, Func-
tion, and Role of Custom Village in
Bali (Government of Bali 1986). The
custom village, as stated in article 5 of
the Regulation, is a unit of societal
customary law that is social and reli-
gious in nature. The village is the for-
3 The first temple is Pura Puseh (Temple of Origin). This is the temple of origin in which the
village community worships its purified and deified ancestors. It lies in the ‘godly direction,’ that
is, towards the mountains and/or east of the village core. Various gods are worshipped in this temple,
but the main ones are an anonymous host of deified predecessors of the present inhabitants of the
village. In the centre of the village, in the intermediate area between earthly and godly activity, lies
Pura Desa (Temple of Village or Great Council). This second temple is primarily concerned with
the fertility of the farmland in its neighbourhood. The third temple is Pura Dalem (Temple of Death)
which is usually located next to the cemetery. It lies in the direction of the sea and/or the western
part of the village. This temple, in addition to being temple of death, is the temple of chthonic powers
where, among other things, the deceased who are not yet fully purified are remembered.
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mal repository and guardian of cus-
tomary law and ritual. Meanwhile, the
function and role of custom village, as
stated in article 6 of the Law, is to
support the implementation of the de-
velopment program planned by the
government, especially in the religious,
cultural, and social areas; and to main-
tain and utilize the wealth of the cus-
tom village for the welfare of the people
within the village. The ratification of
the Provincial Regulation of 1986 re-
flects the Provincial Government’s
concern with reinforcing the role of
community institutions, grounded in
customary law and practice. The con-
sideration of the regulation states that
it recognizes custom village since they
have have grown and developed for
centuries and contributed significantly
to the livability of people in Bali.
The custom villages are usually
subdivided into several banjar (ham-
lets) for densely populated regions
(Warren 1993). However, Warren
points out that in a large number of
communities, especially those found
in the mountain areas, banjar and cus-
tom village represent two associations
covering a single bounded population.
The banjar is the most basic associa-
tion of people in custom villages (com-
munities) through which religious rites,
mutual aid, cultural groups, local de-
velopment projects and savings and
credit activities are organized within
close social ties. The members of banjar
comprise adult men who can prove the
completeness of their identity through
a female partner – usually the wife, but
sometimes sister, mother, or daughter.
The focus of religious, social, and eco-
nomic life of the Balinese is the banjar,
which effectively4 implements local
custom (adat) in the name of the cus-
tom village, and organizes community
life in Bali (Geertz and Geertz 1975;
Hobart et al. 1996; Mabbet 1985).
Arsyad (2005a and 2005b) points out
that the LPDs are rooted in the com-
munity and their establishment is
grounded in the customary law and
practice of its people. The institutions
are community financial institutions
owned, managed, and used by the
members of the custom village. The
staff and clients of the LPDs, there-
fore, have to follow the customary
rules (awig-awig) of the custom vil-
lage.
There have been two important
duties of the banjar (Hobart et al. 1996:
86-88; Mabbet 1985: 38-40). First,
among the most important duties of
the banjar is the maintenance and res-
titution of the ritual purity of the cus-
tom village. Each banjar has specific
tasks and ritual duties to fulfill the
benefit of the village temples. This
indicates that the village as a religious-
magical authority is ranked above the
secular autonomy of the banjar. How-
ever, banjar activities can be very
mundane, for example, improving
roads through community work or re-
storing the meetinghouse (bale banjar).
4 The banjar is effective since its decisions involved the equal participation of all families and
because it operates through consensus rather than confrontation (Mabbet 1985: 39).
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The banjar is generally responsible for
public institutions and even more for
public welfare, which requires not only
material support but also assistance in
ritual matters.
Another important task of the
banjar relates to social control and
surveillance of the actions and behav-
ior of the members in relation to the
custom (Hobart et al. 1996). The banjar
is legally permitted to impose sanc-
tions against members who do not
follow the rules (awig-awig), and fines
may be incurred. Serious offences
against the rules are punished by the
exclusion of the wrongdoer from the
banjar. This means that he/she loses
his/her share of banjar ownership and
the plot of land on which his/her fam-
ily compound is built is withdrawn.
He/she also loses the right, in accor-
dance to the custom, to a funeral in the
village cemetery and subsequent cre-
mation. He/she becomes an outsider
without security of the banjar commu-
nity and must look for new life far
away from their native village. In rela-
tion to the LPDs, which are owned by
the custom village, these kind social of
sanctions can be applied to the staff or
clients who violate the rules of the
financial institution, such as by cor-
ruption or failure to repay their credits
properly (Oka 1999). In other words,
the rules can be expected to have a
positive effect on the repayment rate
of the LPDs.
Methodology
Data and model specification
The fieldwork of this study was
conducted in two parts, the first being
from early December 2001 until the
end of March 2002 and the second in
March 2003. The dataset used as the
basis for calculation and analysis are
mainly based on financial reports of
the LPDs of the Gianyar district in
1999 and 2001 because of the limita-
tions of time and other resources, and
to omit the influence of Indonesian
economic crisis before 1999. Hence,
this study only focuses on the condi-
tion of the LPD in the period of 1999-
2001 when the economic situation of
Bali was stable. The economic situa-
tion after 2001 –that might have
changed– is outside the scope of this
study. In addition, other related data
such as the number of client data (in-
cluding borrowers, savers, and deposi-
tors), the data on population and Gross
Regional Domestic Product (GRDP)
of Gianyar district and its subdistricts
from the Central Board of Statistics of
Gianyar district are also used in this
analysis.
At the end of 2001, it was re-
corded that 174 LPDs have been estab-
lished in Gianyar district and they were
spread all over seven subdistricts.
There are 103 LPDs located in four
subdistricts which are the centre of
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handicraft industries (handicraft-based
subdistricts) and 71 located in three
agricultural-based subdistricts as
shown in Table 2.
After conducting the normality
test for the data using Lilliefors test5
(Coakes and Steed 1999; Keller and
Warrack 2000), the results reveal that
the performance indicators data are
not normally distributed. Since the
datasets are not normally distributed
and the repayment rate is a continuous
variable, an ordinary least squares
model will lead to inefficient param-
eters estimates, because of hetero-
scedasticity problem (Maddala 1983:
16). Alternatively, following
Goldberger (1964), Maddala (1983)
suggests the use of binomial or binary
choice model6 –such as probit (or the
normit model) and logit model– to
overcome the problems because it uses
a dummy variable (for the repayment
rate) instead of a continuous variable.
The probit and logit models usually
give similar results and it is difficult to
distinguish them statistically, since the
cumulative normal distribution of
Table 2. Number of LPDs in Gianyar District by Subdistricts and Economic
Characteristic (2001)
No. Subdistrict Number of LPD Economic characteristics
1 Sukawati 26 Handicraft industry
2 Gianyar 28 Handicraft industry
3 Ubud 24 Handicraft industry
4 Tegallalang 25 Handicraft industry
Subtotal (a) (103)
5 Blahbatuh 25 Agriculture
6 Tampaksiring 23 Agriculture
7 Payangan 23 Agriculture
Subtotal (b) (71)
TOTAL (a + b) 174
Source: PLPDK, Financial Report of LPD Gianyar District of Bali Province (2001)
5 The procedure of this test is presented in the appendices. This test is suited for this case since
the population data which mean and standard deviation are unknown. A test for normality of
Kolmogorov and Smirnov is not relevant to this case since it assumes that the mean and standard
deviation of population is known (Keller and Warrack 2000: 614).
6 These binary-choice models are regression models using discrete dependent variable and
involving two or more qualitative choices. These models assume that individuals are faced with a
choice between two alternatives and that their choice depends on their characteristics.
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probit model and the logistic distribu-
tion are very close to each other
(Amemiya 1985: 09-310; Amemiya
1981: 1502; Maddala 1983: 23;
Tabachnick and Fidell 2001: 536).
However, the assumption that under-
lying distribution is normal makes
probit analysis somewhat more re-
stricted than logit analysis. Hence, the
logit analysis is considered better than
probit analysis if there are too many
cases with very high or very low prob-
abilities so that an underlying normal
distribution is untenable (Tabachnick
and Fidell 2001: 536). The logit model
has another advantage over the probit
model which is the ease of numerical
calculation, as a logistic function is
much easier to calculate that the cumu-
lative normal function of the probit
model (Amemiya 1981). In addition,
the logit model can be used without
any change even with unequal sample
sizes (Maddala 1992: 330-331). For
these reasons, this study estimates the
model by using the logistic model
(logit).
The logit model is based on the
cumulative logistic probability func-
tion and is specified as (Pindyck and
Rubinfeld 1991)
where e represents the base of natural
logarithms, which is approximately
equal to 2.718. Pi is the probability of
a certain event, given X
i
. The first step
to estimate the model is both sides of
the model is multiplied by 1 + e–z
i
 to
get
(1 + e–zi)P
i
 = 1
Dividing by P
i
, and then subtracting 1
leads to
By definition, however, e–zi = 1/ezi, so
that
Now, by taking the natural logarithm
of both sides,
or
Since Pi is the probability of being the
one group, and (1 - P
i
) is the probabil-
ity of being other group, the ratio P
i 
/ (1
- P
i
), known as odds ratio, is simply the
odds in favor of an event A. The natu-
ral log of this odds ratio is called the
logit, and therefore the model is called
the logit model. X
i
 is the vector of
independent variables for the ith obser-
vation;  is the intercept parameter;
and  is the vector of coefficient pa-
rameters.
e–zi =
P
i
1 - P
i
Z
i
 = log
P
i
1 - P
i
log            = Z
i
 =  + Xi
P
i
1 - P
i
Pi = F(Z
i
) = F( + X
i
) =
=
1
e –zi
1
1 + e–( + Xi)
e–zi =         - 1=
1
P
i
1 - P
i
P
i
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The procedure of estimating coef-
ficients is maximum likelihood tech-
niques7 (Amemiya 1981: 1493-1499;
Tabachnick and Fidell 2001: 518), and
the goal is to find the best linear com-
bination of predictors to maximize the
likelihood of obtaining the observed
outcome frequencies. A positive and
significant estimated coefficient would
imply that an increase in the value of
the particular explanatory variable is
associated with an increased probabil-
ity of the dependent variable taking the
value one. Given the exploratory na-
ture of the analysis, the reliance on
imperfect proxies and the nonlinear
relationship between the dependent and
independent variables, no attempt has
been made to interpret the magnitudes
of the coefficients of the explanatory
variables. Rather, the analysis focuses
on the signs and significance of the
estimated coefficients. Collinearity
diagnostics are performed on each set
of explanatory variable employed in
the model, to ensure that multi-col-
linearity is not adversely affecting the
estimation of the coefficients
The logit model is used to study
the repayment rate (RR) of 154 LPDs
in Gianyar district, in 2001. Since the
repayment rates in this study are con-
tinuous variable, they are converted to
a discrete variable. In this model, P
i
 is
probability of LPDs having repayment
rates “above” average of repayment
rate of its population, (1 - P
i 
) is a
probability of LPDs having repayment
rates “below” average of repayment
rate of its population.
Hence the logit model becomes
The repayment rate is expected to
be influenced by a range of explana-
tory variables that reflect program-
specific and community socioeco-
nomic characteristics. The expected
signs for the parameters coefficient
are shown in Table 3. The independent
variables are as follow. First, OUTSTL
is a total balance of outstanding loans
of each LPD (in Rupiah). The hypoth-
esis is the higher total balance of out-
standing loans of the LPD, the higher
is its repayment rate (Sharma and Zeller
1997). This is because the greater the
loan size put pressure on the borrower
to reduce the delinquency rate. Sec-
ond, NUMBOR is number of clients
(borrowers) of each LPD. The hypoth-
esis is the larger the number of clients
of a microfinance institution, the lower
is its repayment rate. The larger num-
ber of borrowers could raise asymmet-
ric information problem and make
monitoring and enforcing costly and
less effective (Sharma and Zeller 1997).
7 Maximum likelihood estimation is an iterative procedure that starts with arbitrary values of
coefficients and determines the direction and size of change in the coefficients that will maximize
the likelihood of obtaining the observed frequencies (Tabachnick and Fidel 2001: 518).
1, if the repayment rate is “above” average
0, otherwise
y
i {
log                             = Z
i 
=  + X
i
Prob (RR>above)
1 - Prob (RR>above)
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Third, NUMSAVER is the num-
ber of savers. The hypothesis is the
higher number of savers in microfi-
nance institution, the higher its repay-
ment rate. The number of savers (and
savings) is an essential element for
improving the repayment rate since
savers may indicate the banking
mindedness and the financial disci-
plines of clients (Zeller 1998: 614).
Fourth, NUMSTAF is number of staff,
which is measured by number of staff
of each LPD. I hypothesize that the
larger number of staff in the LPDs, the
higher its repayment rate. It is ex-
pected that a larger number of staff in
the LPDs will result in a better repay-
ment rate, since they would be able to
manage the LPDs better.
Fifth, WEALTH (dummy) is a
dummy variable for the wealth index
of the clients. It is hypothesized that
the wealth of clients has a positive and
significant relationship with the re-
payment rate (Zeller 1998: 615). This
variable equals one if the LPDs lo-
cated in subdistricts having GRDP per
capita “above” the GRDP per capita of
the district and zero when the LPDs
located in subdistricts having GRDP
per capita “below” average of the dis-
trict. Sixth, DUMVIL (dummy vari-
able for region) is a control variable
for the economic base of villages that
might influence the repayment rate
(Zeller 1998: 613). The hypothesis is
there will be a significant relationship
between the economic base of a vil-
lage and the repayment rate of the LPD
in that village. This variable has the
value of one if the LPD is located in
small-scale industries based village and
zero when it is located in agricultural
based village. It is expected that the
repayment rate is affected by the
client’s occupation, in particular,
whether he or she is employed in the
agricultural sector or in small-scale
industry. Table 3 summarizes the in-
dependent variables and expected signs
for the ordinary least square model.
The specification model of the repay-
ment rate is as follows:
Table 3. Independent Variables and Expected Signs of Logit Model for the
Repayment Rate of the LPDs
Independent Variable Expected Sign
Outstanding loans (OUTSTL) +
Number of borrowers (NUMBOR) -
Number of savers (NUMSAVER) +
Number of staff (NUMSTAF) +
Wealth index (WEALTH) +
Dummy regions (DUMVIL) *
Note: * = no a priori expectation for sign direction
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  + 1OUTSTL + 2NUMBOR +
3NUMSAVER + 4NUMSTAF +
5WEALTH + 6DUMVIL
Results and Analysis
According to Bank BPD Bali
(2000), the loans portfolio of LPD is
classified into four categories: pass,
doubtful, substandard, and loss. In this
study the repayment rate refers to the
ratio between the first three categories
of outstanding loans divided by total
outstanding loans (all four categories),
and delinquent borrower ratio refers to
the number of borrowers who do not
repay their loans until past due relative
to total borrowers. Based on the data in
Table 4, the LPDs within Gianyar dis-
trict have a high repayment rate.
In 1999 the repayment rate was 95
percent and increased to 97 percent in
2001 (Table 4). Compared to the other
microfinance institutions in Indone-
sia, these figures are quite high.8 The
repayment rate of Badan Kredit
Kecamatan (Subdistrict Credit
Organisation) of Central Java was only
80 percent. Meanwhile, the repayment
rate of the BRI Unit Desa System was
estimated 95 percent (Yaron et al.
1998). In addition to a high repayment
rate, its delinquent borrowers ratio
was only 0.5 percent in 1999 and de-
creased to 0.4 percent in 2001. Follow-
ing Christen et al (1995: 3), these high
repayment rate and the low delinquent
borrowers ratio of the LPDs are evi-
dences of the willingness of the clients
to pay the interest rate even the interest
rates are significantly above the rate of
inflation.
There are four interrelating rea-
sons that could explain the high repay-
ment rate (Arsyad 2005b; Arsyad
2005). Firstly, in accordance with its
regulation, an LPD only gives loans to
the clients who have their own busi-
ness, such as small-scale industry en-
trepreneurs, farmers, or small traders.
The credit should be used for produc-
tive economic activities purposes
(Government of Bali 2002) . For the
LPDs management, it is relatively easy
to identify the credit applicants whether
or not they have business activities
since the operational area of each LPD
is limited in a custom village in which
most of the people know each other.
log
Prob (RR>above)
1 - Prob (RR>above)
8 This comparison is not intended to judge that the LPD has a better repayment rate than the
others, since it was calculated in different period and the methods of calculation might be different
either. Nevertheless, it is still useful as a general illustration.
Table 4.Repayment Rate of LPDs
within Gianyar District of
Bali Province (1999 and
2001) (means)
Indicator 1999 2001
Repayment rate (%) 95 97
Source: PLPDK, Financial Report of LPD
Gianyar District of Bali Province (1999
and 2001) (computed by the author).
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As a result, this could positively influ-
ence their repayment ability. The use
of village agents, such as custom vil-
lage leader in Bali, in screening poten-
tial borrowers and collecting repay-
ment would help to mitigate the infor-
mation problems that hamper the per-
formance of microfinance institutions
when lending to small entrepreneurs
(Arsyad 2005b; Arsyad 2005; Chaves
and Gonzales-Vega 1996; Fuentes
1996; Onchan 1992; Timberg and
Aiyar 1984; Yaron 1992). In addition,
by gaining access through the agent to
village-level enforcement mechanisms
such as social sanctions, the micro-
finance institution may also mitigate
some of the problems it faces when
collecting repayment.
Secondly, most of the borrowers
are from the custom village where the
LPD is located. The LPDs are commu-
nity financial institutions which are
owned, managed, and used by the
members of the custom village. This
embeddedness of the LPDs within its
local institutions has caused the cli-
ents’ sense of belonging of their LPD
and moral obligation to help the devel-
opment of their LPD. Moreover, in
credit mechanism including screening
process and contractual enforcement,
the LPDs management cooperates with
the Board of Commissioners (Dewan
Pengawas) –led by the custom village
leader (Bendesa Adat)– who knows
the character (reputation) of the cli-
ents well. This technique has been
comparatively efficient in avoiding
costly mistakes in assessing the prob-
ability of loan repayment (Arsyad
2005b; Arsyad 2005).
Thirdly, the custom (social) sanc-
tions –that can be applied in accor-
dance with the written custom village
regulations (awig-awig) – have forced
the borrowers to repay their credits
timely. According to the interviewees
and Oka (1999: 17), the custom village
regulation has been effective in over-
coming the problem of delinquent bor-
rowers or low repayment rate. Finally,
the LPDs staff members have a high
mobility in respect to collecting loan
repayments. A LPD staff member vis-
its the clients in their houses (mobile
banking techniques) to collect savings
deposits and loan repayments in per-
son. This system has also forced the
clients to repay their loans regularly
and timely.
In summary, it could be argued
that a high repayment rate of LPDs is
affected by practical arrangement of
LPD management using custom regu-
lation which includes social norms,
sanctions, and involvement of custom
village leader in screening process and
contractual enforcement of loan (in-
formal institutions), regulations set up
by the Central Bank (formal institu-
tions), and the mechanism of collect-
ing loan repayments applied by the
LPDs management.
As mentioned earlier, a direct lo-
gistic regression analysis was per-
formed on the repayment rate and six
predictors: outstanding loans, number
of borrowers, number of savers, num-
ber of staff, wealth index, and dummy
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variable for regions. Analysis was per-
formed using SPSS LOGIT. After de-
letion of 2 cases of missing values,
data from 152 LPDs were available for
analysis: 88 LPDs with the repayment
rates (RR) above the average RR of its
population rate and 64 LPDs with RR
below the average RR of its population
rate.
The first step in any regression
analysis is to ask if the predictors, as a
group, contribute to prediction of the
outcome. In logistic regressions, this
is the comparison of the constant-only
model with the constant plus all pre-
dictors model. The test results of the
full model with all six predictors against
a constant-only model using Hosmer
and Lemeshow test are statistically
reliable, 2(8, N =152) = 18.36, p<0.05
(p-calculated = .019). This indicates
that the predictors, as a set, reliably
predict the repayment rate of the LPDs.
Moreover, this result also indicates
that there is no multicollinearity prob-
lem (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).
The strength of the relationship
between the dependent variable and
the independent variables –analogous
to the R2 measures in multiple regres-
sion– is shown by the Cox and Snell R2
and the Nagelkerke R2 with higher
values indicate greater model fit
(Tabachnick and Fidell 2001: 545).
Both R2 are low, the Cox and Snell R2
is only 0.063 and the Nagelkerke R2 is
only 0.08. These figures indicate that
only around six to eight percent of
shared variance between the repay-
ment rate and the set of predictors can
be found. Hence, the gain in prediction
is minimal. The model prediction suc-
cess confirms that the ability of the
model in predict the repayment rate
are not high, even the predictors in the
model is significant. The overall suc-
cess rate is 65 percent (the cut value is
50 percent), with 84 percent of the
LPDs with the RR above average and
39 percent of the LPDs with the RR
below average. This result also indi-
cates that the predictors, as a set, reli-
Table 5. Logistic Regression Analysis of the Repayment Rate
Variables Coefficients Wald test Significance
(p-value)*
1. Outstanding loans .000 .084 .772
2. Number of borrowers .000 .053 .818
3. Number of savers -.001 2.646 .104
4. Number of staff .004 .001 .972
5. Wealth index .070 .034 .853
6. Dummy regions .303 .594 .441
7. Constant .143 .066 .797
Note: * Critical p-value is 0.05 (p-value<0.05 means significant, otherwise).
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ably distinguish the repayment rate of
the LPDs with the repayment rate above
average and the LPDs with repayment
rate below average.
According to the Wald criterion,
there is no statistically significant pre-
dictors influencing the repayment rate.
Table 5 shows regression coefficients
and Wald test for each of coefficients.
The signs for four regression coeffi-
cients are as expected, but two other
coefficients are not. These results are
discussed below.
In methodology, outstanding loans
are hypothesized to have a positive
effect on the repayment rate. How-
ever, the regression coefficient of out-
standing loans (OUTSTL) is insignifi-
cant (p-value>0.05). This means that
the outstanding loans do not influence
the repayment rate. The hypothesis
that the greater the loan size, the greater
is the probability of unwilling default
(greater repayment rate) or the greater
loan size puts pressure on the bor-
rower to reduce delinquency, is not
proven. Therefore, the outstanding
loans do neither improve nor worsen
the repayment rate in this case. The
finding concurs with Sharma and
Zeller’s (1997) study of microfinance
institutions (ASA, BRAC, and RDRS)
in Bangladesh (Sharma and Zeller
1997).
The number of savers and the value
of savings reflect the financial disci-
pline of the clients of a microfinance
institution, as has been mentioned ear-
lier. These factors could be expected
to increase the repayment rate or to
maintain a high repayment rate. How-
ever, the regression coefficient of num-
ber of savers (NUMSAVR) is insig-
nificant. This means that the number
of savers does not influence their re-
payment rate. The result implies that
the influence of the savers on improv-
ing the repayment rate is not signifi-
cant. On the other hand, however, this
result indicates that the financial disci-
pline of the clients of LPDs is high, as
shown by their high repayment rates
discussed earlier. Hence, regardless
the provision of savings service, the
repayment rate of the LPDs remains
high. Referring to Arsyad’s studies
(2005 and 2005b), this situation might
be affected by the effectiveness of
social sanctions (written in the custom
village regulation) in enforcing con-
tractual agreement between the LPDs
and their clients.
The regression coefficient of num-
ber of borrowers (BORROWERS) is
insignificant. This means that the num-
ber of borrowers does not influence
the repayment rate. The hypothesis
that the larger number of borrower
could cause imperfect information
problems (monitoring and enforcing
problem) that would in turn affect the
repayment rate is not evident in this
study. The LPDs have intimate knowl-
edge of their clients and rely on mecha-
nisms of social control in screening
and enforcement problems based on
the shared social and religious norms
of the custom village (Arsyad 2005b
and 2005). As a result, client informa-
tion is easily available which could
eliminate the asymmetric information
and adverse selection problems as a
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key problem that affects the likelihood
of default of microfi-nance institution.
The study by Sharma and Zeller (1997)
also reveals that the number of bor-
rowers per staff does not affect the
repayment rate of micro-finance insti-
tutions in Bangladesh.
As is hypothesized earlier, the
larger number of staff, the higher is the
repayment rate since the larger num-
ber of staff, the higher is the LPD
staff’s capability of monitoring and
managing their clients. In this study,
however, the number of staff does not
have any influence on the repayment
rate which is shown by the insignifi-
cant regression coefficient of number
of staff (NUMSTAF). This implies
that the number of current staff has
been quite enough to manage the LPDs.
With the ratio of 67 borrowers per staff
in 2001, the LPDs are still able to
maintain their high repayment rates.
Two dummy variables which are
WEALTH and REGION do not have a
significant effect on the repayment
rate either. The regression coefficient
of dummy variable WEALTH1 and
WEALTH2 –control for GRDP per
capita of subdistrict– is insignificant.
This means that the wealth of the cli-
ents does not influence their repay-
ment rate. The result shows that the
wealthier clients (handicraft subdis-
tricts) do not repay their debt any bet-
ter than the poorer ones (agricultural
subdistricts). Hence, in other words,
the wealth of group member does not
improve the repayment rate, and the
capacity to repay does not matter in
actual repayment performance in the
case of LPDs. Theoretically, the re-
payment rate is a function of both
capacity and willingness to repay
(Norell 2001: 128).9 Accordingly, this
implies that willingness to repay is the
most important factor affecting the
high repayment rate of LPDs. Again,
referring to Arsyad’s studies (2005
and 2005b), this good willingness to
repay might be a result from the effec-
tiveness of social sanctions in enforc-
ing contractual agreement between the
LPDs and their clients.
The regression coefficient of
dummy variable REGION1 and RE-
GION2 –control for socioeconomic
conditions that may influence the re-
payment rate– is not significant. It
means that the type of regions (handi-
craft based subdistricts or agricultural
based subdistricts) has no influence on
the repayment rate of the LPDs. Hence,
it can be concluded that the repayment
rate of the LPDs in Gianyar district is
not influenced by the socioeconomic
conditions of the regions. Then it could
be argued that the repayment rate of
LPDs is directly affected by practical
arrangement of LPD management us-
ing custom regulation including social
norms, sanctions, and involvement of
9 In respect to capacity and willingness to repay, Norell (2001) classifies four types of clients:
willing and able to repay, willing but unable to repay, unwilling but able to repay, and unwilling and
unable to repay.
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custom village leader in screening pro-
cess and contractual enforcement of
loan (informal institutions), and indi-
rectly affected regulations set up by
the Central Bank (formal institutions).
The insignificancy of all predic-
tors in the model leads to a question of
what factors do influence the repay-
ment rate. Referring to Arsyad’s stud-
ies (2005 and 2005b), it could be ar-
gued that this condition indicates that
the informal institutions –such as cus-
tom regulation (social norms and sanc-
tions), social cohesion, and the use of
social mechanism in screening the
credit applicants and enforcing the re-
payment through involvement of the
custom leader– have played an impor-
tant role in enforcing the willingness
to repay of the clients that, in turn,
results in the high repayment rate of
the LPDs.
Some studies (Arnott and Stiglitz
1990; Fuentes 1996; Stiglitz 1990) re-
veal that informal institutions tend to
exploit a comparative advantage in
monitoring and enforcement capacity.
The primary advantage of the LPDs –
as a local institution– in terms of moni-
toring is that individuals who interact
in a variety of non-market contexts
tend to know each other well. They
therefore may have a greater ability to
monitor each other than do commer-
cial banks. In this respect, the charac-
ter-based lending system has been ap-
plied appropriately and effectively by
the LPDs through social mechanism.
This finding also conforms to
Chaves and Gonzales-Vega’s (1995)
argument that social pressure from lo-
cal tradition is one of the important
factors affecting compliance of
microfinance clients in the rural areas
of Indonesia. Hence, it could be in-
ferred that the high repayment rate of
the LPDs in Gianyar district of Bali
has been influenced by the informal
institutions.
Conclusion
An analysis of the repayment rate
using quantitative approach (logistic
model) indicates that the Balinese so-
cial custom, including social values,
norms, and sanctions have an impor-
tant influence on sustaining the high
repayment rate of the LPDs. This find-
ing conforms to the previous studies
using institutional approach (Arsyad
2005b, 2005c and 2005) revealing that
the high repayment rate of the LPDs in
Gianyar district is influenced by their
institutional arrangement that based
on custom regulation which includes
social norms, sanctions, and involve-
ment of custom village leader in screen-
ing process and contractual enforce-
ment of loan (informal institutions),
by regulations set up by the Central
Bank (formal institutions), and the
mechanism of collecting loan repay-
ments applied by the LPDs manage-
ment.
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Appendices
1. List of Interviewees*
No. Name Position Date of Interview
1 Bagus Sara Provincial Government Officer 6 February 2002
2 Gusti Arya Provincial Government Officer 6 February 200220
February 2003
3 Bagus Sana Bank BPD Bali Officer 7 February 200221
February 2003
4 Wayan Weka Bank BPD Bali Officer 7 February 2002
21 February 2003
5 Nyoman Awan Chairman of LPD Talepud 7 & 8 February 2002
6 Made Dana Chairman of LPD Mas 21-23 February 2003
7 Ketut Awan Chairman of LPD Kerta 25 & 26 February 2003
8 Wayan Jana Member of Commissioner Board of LPD Mas 23 February 2003
9 Gde Dana Chief of Commissioner Board of LPD Kerta 25 & 26 February 2003
10 Ktut Empu LPD client 22 February 2002
11 Wayan Elin LPD client 23 February 2002
12 Wayan Arsha LPD client 22 February 2002
*Name of interviewees are disguised
2. Procedure of conducting Lillifors Test
The procedure of this test is taken from Keller & Warrack (2000, p.614-617) and Coakes
& Steed (2001, p.35). The procedure as follows:
Suppose a cumulative distribution function is defined as
F(x) = P (X  x)
The tables of cumulative binomial and Poisson distributions provide values for
for several values of k.
The sample cumulative distribution function, S(x), is defined as the proportion of sample
values that are less than or equal to x. The mean (x) and s are calculated from the data. Then
we define the test statistic D as the largest absolute difference between S(x) and F(x). That
is,
D = max F(x) – S(x)
P (X x) = P(x)
P
X=0
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Then we test the hypotheses
H
0
: The data are normally distributed
H
1
: The data are not normally distributed
Suppose  = 0.05 (level of significance for testing these hypotheses) or based on the level
of significance a and the sample size we can find the critical value of D from the Lillifors
table. When the significance level is greater than 0.05 or D-calculated is greater than D-
critical value, then normality is assumed.
3. Computer Results of Logistic Analysis
Block 0: Beginning Block
Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Casesa N Percent
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 152 98.7
Missing Cases 2 1.3
Total 154 100.0
Unselected Cases 0 .0
Total 154 100.0
a If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of cases
Catgegorical Variables Codings
Parameter
Frequency (1)
DUMMY-REGIONS 0 61 1.000
1 91 .000
WEALTH INDEX 0 90 1.000
1 62 .000
Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value Internal Value
0 0
1 1
Classification Tablea,b
Predicted
BI-REPAYMENT-RATE
Observed 0 1
Step 0 BI-REPAYMENT-RATE 0 88 100.0
a Constant is included in the model b The cut value is .500
Percentage
Correct
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Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp (B)
Step 0 Constant -.318 .164 3.758 1 .053 .727
Variables not in the Equationa
Score df Sig.
Step 0 Variables OUTS2001 4.045 1 .044
BORROWER 4.131 1 .042
SAVERS 6.849 1 .009
NSTAFF 3.945 1 .047
WEALTH(1) .001 1 .972
DUMMY(1) .053 1 .819
a Residual Chi-Squares are not computed because of redundancies
Block 1: Method= Enter
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-Square df Sig.
Step 1 Step 9.842 6 .131
Block 9.842 6 .131
Model 9.842 6 .131
.131
Model Summary
-2 Log Cox and Snell Nagelkerke
Step likelihood R Square R Square
1 197.070 .063 .084
Hosmer and Lemeshow
Step Chi-Square df Sig.
1 18.357 8 0.19
273
Arsyad—Assessing Factors Affecting the Repayment Rate of Microfinance Institutions
Contigency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
BI-PAYMENT-RATE BI-PAYMENT-RATE
= 0 = 1
Step Observed Expected Observed Expected Total
   1 1 10 12.500 5 2.500 15
2 13 10.388 2 4.612 15
3 11 9.566 4 5.434 15
4 10 9.069 5 5.931 15
5 11 8.690 4 6.310 15
6 4 8.210 11 6.790 15
7 8 7.858 7 7.142 15
8 10 7.491 5 7.509 15
9 3 7.017 12 7.983 15
10 8 7.211 9 9.789 17
Classification Tablea
BI-REPAYMENT-RATE
Observed 0 1
Step 1 BI-PAYMENT-RATE 0 74 14 84.1
1 39 25 39.1
Overall Percentage 65.1
a The cut value is .500
Percentage
Correct
